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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model with hetero-
geneous rms and entrepreneur's portfolio choice. We analytically show
that this model generates the Pareto distribution of top income earners
and Zipf's law of rms at the steady state. The dierential equation for
the probability density distribution of income is derived and numerically
evaluated. In the model, CEOs respond to a tax cut by increasing their
share of stocks of their own rms, thereby increasing the diusion of their
wealth. The calibrated model shows that the transition path matches
with the decline of the Pareto exponent of the income distribution and
the trend of top 1% income share in the U.S. in recent decades. We argue
that the low marginal income tax at the top bracket of income could lead
to the higher dispersion of income among the top income earners, which
results in the higher concentration of income in the top income group.
JEL Codes: D31, L11, O40
Keywords: income distribution; wealth distribution; Pareto exponent; top
income share; rm size distribution; Zipf's law
1 Introduction
There has been a secular trend towards the concentration of income on top
earners in the U.S. economy for the last three decades. According to Alvaredo
et al. (2013), the income share of top 1% earners declined from around 18% to
8% after the 1930s but the trend has reversed during the 1970s. Since then,
the top 1% share has grown to 18% by 2010, now on a par with the prewar
level. Piketty and Saez (2003) found that this trend is particular in the very
top percentile, while the concentration on the lesser percentile group has been
much milder.
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Along with the increasing trend of the top income share, a widening dis-
persion of income within the top income group has been also observed over the
same periods. It is known that the tail part of income follows a Pareto distri-
bution very well. When income follows a Pareto distribution with exponent ,
the ratio of the number of people who earn more than x1 to those who earn
more than x2, for any income levels x1 and x2, is (x1=x2)
. Thus, the Pareto
exponent  is a measure of equality among the riches. The estimated Pareto
exponent shows a close connection with the top income share historically. It
declined from 2.46 in 1975 to 1.6 in 2010 along with the secular increase in the
top 1% share.
In this paper, we argue that the concentration of income in the last three
decades was driven by the economic force that caused income dispersion of top
earners. Among the driving forces of dispersion among the rich, we pay special
attention to the decrease in the marginal income tax rate, the importance of
stock-related income through the widespread use of employee stock options for
CEOs or founding entrepreneur's share ownership, and the changing volatility of
rm's risk environment. We present a model of portfolio choice by CEOs, who
can invest in their own rms' risky stocks or in risk-free assets. The dispersion
of CEO's income is determined by the extent of the risk taken in their after-tax
returns of portfolio.
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms
and the CEO's portfolio choice. In this type of model, the distribution of CEO's
pay can be strongly aected by the distribution of rm size. It is known that the
rm size distribution follows a Zipf's law, a special case of Pareto distribution
with exponent  = 1. As a discipline for our approach, we require our model to
generate the Zipf's law of rms, while our main focus is the Pareto distribution
of income.
The contribution of the paper is summarized as follows. First, this paper
presents a parsimonious neoclassical growth model that generates Zipf's law of
rms and Pareto's law of incomes. The model is simple enough to allow the ana-
lytical derivation of the stationary distributions of rms and income. Second, we
obtain an analytical expression for the evolution of probability density distribu-
tion of income in the transition path. Using this expression, we can implement
numerical computation of the transition dynamics of income distribution after
an unanticipated and permanent cut in top marginal income tax rate. Third,
we calibrate the model parameters and show that the transition path matches
the decline of the Pareto exponent of the income distribution and the trend of
increasing top income share in the last three decades. Hence, we argue that the
calibrated analysis of our model predicts that the tax cut and CEOs' response to
tax in their portfolio can explain the widening dispersion and more concentra-
tion of income. The numerical exercises show that the change in rm's volatility
explains little dispersion of top income, since the portfolio choice responds to
the change in order to mitigate the impact of the rm's volatility on the risk
of CEO's portfolio. The calibrated model brings out testable implications on
CEO portfolios and future development of inequality under the current tax rate
level.
Much has been debated about the causes of the concentration of income in
recent decades. Among them, Piketty and Saez (2003) argue that a cut in top
marginal income tax rate is one of the plausible interpretations, compared with
other interpretations such as skill-biased technical change. Our paper shares the
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view with theirs that a tax cut is an important factor. Our model diers from
theirs in that a cut in top marginal income tax rate itself does not matter, while
a cut in top marginal income tax rate relative to other taxes, such as capital
gains and corporate taxes, does matter. The reason that a cut in top marginal
income tax rate itself does not matter in our model comes from the property
that top marginal income tax in our model plays the same role as dividend tax in
the \new view" of dividend taxation (Sinn, 1991 and McGrattan and Prescott,
2005).
Recently, several papers have built models to understand why income dis-
tribution follows a Pareto distribution. There are two types of approaches in
the literature. First approach explains Pareto's law of incomes by the assump-
tion that other distributions follow certain types of distributions. Gabaix and
Landier (2008) take this approach. They construct a model of the CEO pay,
which assumes that the rm size distribution follows Zipf's law and that the
CEO's talent follows a certain distribution. Under the settings, they show that
the CEO pay distribution follows a Pareto distribution. An advantage of their
model is that their model is consistent with the two stylized facts, i.e., Zipf's
law of rms and Pareto's law of incomes. Jones and Kim (2012) extend the
model to be consistent with the recent decline in the Pareto exponent of the
income distribution in the U.S., which is assumed to be constant in Gabaix and
Landier (2008). Compared with the papers taking this approach, our paper's
contribution is to build a model that generates the Zipf's law and the Pareto's
law both from the productivity shocks of rms without assuming certain types
of distributions.
Second approach explains Pareto's law of incomes by idiosyncratic shocks.
Using a household model with a consumption function, Nirei and Souma (2007)
show that idiosyncratic shocks on the household asset returns generate Pareto's
law of assets and incomes. Benhabib et al. (2011) show a similar result in
the model of households who optimally make saving and bequest decisions.
These models are not dynamic general equilibrium models in a sense that they
only consider the household side problem and do not consider the rm side.
Nirei (2009) extends the framework to a Bewley-type model and shows that
idiosyncratic shocks on rms' productivities generate the Pareto's law of incomes
in dynamic general equilibrium environment. Toda (2012) also builds a similar
but more analytically tractable dynamic general equilibrium model and derive
the Pareto's law. Our paper belongs to this approach. Compared with the
previous studies, this paper features a model that can explain the Zipf's law of
rms, and analyzes how the recent tax cut aects the evolution of top incomes.1
Perhaps, the closest paper to ours is Kim (2013), who following the latter ap-
proach, builds a model of human capital accumulation with idiosyncratic shocks
that generates the Pareto's law of incomes. Using the model, she analyzes how
a cut in top marginal income tax in recent decades aects the Pareto exponent
of income distribution. Compared with her paper, our paper's contribution is to
build a model that also explains Zipf's law of rms, both from the same shocks
that generate the Pareto's law of incomes. In addition, because the mechanism
through which a tax cut aects top incomes is dierent between hers and ours,
the predictions of the models are also dierent. For example, in her model,
1Especially, this paper's model is consistent with the fact that the rm's productivity
distribution also follows a Pareto distribution (Mizuno et al., 2012).
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an income tax cut encourages human capital accumulation among top income
earners, which would result in the labor productivity increase in the U.S. in
recent decades compared with the previous periods and other countries such
as France. In contrast, in our model, a tax cut does not directly aect capital
accumulation.
Finally, our model is also closely related with the general equilibrium models
of the rm size distribution that explain Zipf's law of rms (for a survey, see
Luttmer, 2010). The basic mechanism employed in our paper to generate Zipf's
law of rms draws on the literature. Compared with the literature, our rm
side formulation is a rather simplied one, because our focus is to understand
the evolution of top incomes.
The organization of the paper is follows. Section 2 sets up a dynamic general
equilibrium model. Section 3 discusses the rm side properties of the model and
derives Zipf's law of rms. Section 4 denes the equilibrium of the model and
how to solve the model. After dening the equilibrium, Section 5 illustrates
how in the steady state the household asset and income distribution follows a
Pareto distribution. Section 6 analyzes how a tax cut aects top incomes in our
model and contrasts the results with data. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
It is well known that the distribution of certain types of stochastic processes
follows a Pareto distribution. The purpose of the model presented here is to
incorporate the types of stochastic processes into otherwise standard general
equilibrium model with incomplete markets and to replicate Pareto distributions
observed as stylized facts. Key assumptions that generate Zipf's law of rms
are that rm's productivity is aected by multiplicative idiosyncratic shocks and
that there is a lower bound for the rm size. Similarly, key assumptions that
generate Pareto's law of household's assets and incomes are that household's
asset is aected by multiplicative idiosyncratic shocks and that each household
faces a constant probability of death (i.e., the perpetual youth assumption). In
the next sections, we discuss how these properties generate these laws.
2.1 Household's problem
There is a continuum of households with a mass L. As in Blanchard (1985), each
household is discontinued by a Poisson hazard rate . Households participate
in a pension program. If a household dies, all of his non-human wealth is
distributed to living households. Instead, if a household does not die, he obtains
a part of the capital of the dead. The amount he gets is proportional to his
wealth, that is, the pension premium rate  times his wealth.
The households consist of entrepreneurs and workers. A mass N of house-
holds are entrepreneurs referred to as entrepreneurs and can hold the shares of
his rm si;t referred to as risky asset and risk-free market portfolio bi;t. We as-
sume that the risky asset is aected by uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks. Each
entrepreneur leaves the rm by a Poisson hazard rate pf , and becomes a worker.
We refer to such households as former entrepreneurs.2
2 We introduce the former entrepreneurs for a purely quantitative reason. The qualitative
results of paper are intact even when pf = 0. Quantitatively, if we do not introduce the former
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The remaining L N of households are workers and can only hold risk-free
assets bi;t (therefore, for them, si;t = 0). There are two types of workers. The
one is the former entrepreneurs and the other is workers by birth. We refer to
the latter type of workers as innate workers.
These households maximize expected discounted utility by choosing sequences
of consumption and asset portfolio. Let qi;t and di;t be the price and dividend
of the risky asset. The return of the risky asset is described by the following
stochastic process:
((1  e)di;tdt+ dqi;t)=qi;t = q;tdt+ q;tdBi;t;
where e is the tax rate on risky asset and Bi;t is a Wiener process. We interpret
 e as top marginal tax rate on ordinary income in the numerical analysis. Risk-
free assets yield a net return rft with certainty. The sum of the two asset holdings
constitutes a nancial wealth si;tqi;t + bi;t.
These households earn a constant labor income ow wt and obtain govern-
ment transfers tr t. The human asset is dened by ht =
R1
t
(wu+tru)e
  R u
t
(+rfs )dsdu.
The labor income ow is expressed as an annuity payment
wt + tr t =( + r
f
t )ht   dht=dt: (1)
Let ai;t = si;tqi;t + bi;t + ht denote total wealth of a household. The accu-
mulation of total wealth grows according to the following process:
dai;t = ((si;tqi;t + bi;t) + q;tsi;tqi;t + r
f
t bi;t + ( + r
f
t )ht   ci;t)dt
+q;tsi;tqi;t
= a;tai;tdt+ a;tai;tdBi;t: (2)
where a;tai;t  ai;t + q;txi;tai;t + rft (1  xi;t)ai;t   ci;t, a;tai;t  q;txi;tai;t,
and xi;t is the share of ai;t invested in the risky asset. Note that dBi;t is a
multiplicative shock to the asset accumulation in that the shock is multiplied
by the current asset level ai;t.
Household's dynamic programming problem is specied as follows.
V i(ai;t;St; t) = max
ci;t;xi;t
ln ci;tdt+ e
 (+)dt
Et[V
i0(ai;t+dt;St+dt; t+ dt)] (3)
subject to (2), where St is a set of aggregate variables that describes the ag-
gregate dynamics of the model (for the denition, see Section 4.2), V i denotes
value functions of household characteristics i: if the household is an entrepreneur
i = e, if he is an innate worker i = w, and if he is a former entrepreneur i = f .
Note that if the household is an entrepreneur, the household characteristics in
the next period, denoted by i0, can be both entrepreneur and worker. If the
household is an innate worker or a former entrepreneur, i0 = i.
The household problem is a variant of Merton's dynamic portfolio problem
(Merton, 1969, 1971, 1973, and Campbell and Viceira, 2002). It is well known
that the solution of the problem under the log coincides with the myopic rules,
entrepreneurs and all of the entrepreneurs remain the positions, the mobility of household's
asset or income level becomes too slow or the Pareto exponent of income distribution becomes
too low, compared with the data.
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whose solution is :
xi;t =
(
q;t rft
2q;t
; if i = e,
0; otherwise,
(4)
vi;t = + ; (5)
where vi;t is the consumption-wealth ratio (see Appendix A for derivations).
In the model, we assume that entrepreneurs can hold either risky assets
of his own rm or risk-free assets. We can relax the assumption and allow
entrepreneurs to hold risky assets of other rms whose expected returns are as
low as that of risk-free assets, rf , due to transaction costs explained in the next
section. Then, because the shocks on risky assets are assumed to be uncorrelated
with one another, the portfolio share of another rm's risky asset x0i;t, becomes
(rft  rft )=(0q;t)2 = 0, where 0q;t is the volatility of this risky asset, (see Campbell
and Viceira, 2002). It implies that the results are unchanged by relaxing the
assumption.
2.2 Firms and the nancial market
A continuum of rms with a mass N produces dierentiated goods. As in Mc-
Grattan and Prescott (2005), each rm issues shares, and owns and self-nances
capital kj;t. As noted above, the entrepreneur of the rm can directly own the
shares of his rm. Financial intermediaries also own the shares of the rm and
by combining the shares, issue risk-free market portfolio to households, which
diversies the idiosyncratic shocks of the rms. The nancial intermediaries
incur  per dividend dj;t as transaction costs. We assume that nancial inter-
mediaries possess the majority shares, or that when an entrepreneur possesses
his rm's shares, they are preferred stocks without voting rights. Then, follow-
ing the interest of nancial intermediaries, rms maximize the expected prots,
and the market value of a rm is priced at the net present value of the after-
tax prots discounted by the risk-free rate rft . We make these assumptions to
simplify the analysis.
2.2.1 Financial intermediary's problem
We assume that returns and risks on risky assets are ex ante identical and
that shocks on the risky assets are uncorrelated with each other. A nancial
intermediary maximizes the residual prot by diversifying the risks on risky
assets and issuing risk-free assets:
max
sfj;t
Et
" Z N
0

(1  f   )dj;tdt+ dqj;t
	
sfj;tdj
!#
  rft dt
 Z N
0
qj;ts
f
j;tdj
!
;
where sfj;t is the shares of rm j owned by the nancial intermediary and 
f
is the tax on the dividend. We interpret f in the numerical analysis as the
combination of capital gains and corporate income taxes. The solution of the
problem leads to
rft qj;tdt = Et[(1  f   )dj;tdt+ dqj;t]: (6)
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2.2.2 Firm's problem
There are heterogeneous rms in the economy. The production function of rm
j is
yj;t = zj;tk

j;t`
1 
j;t :
The productivity of the rm evolves as
dzj;t = zzj;tdt+ zzj;tdBj;t;
where Bj;t is a Wiener process, which is uncorrelated with shocks in other rms.
Note that dBj;t is a multiplicative shock to the productivity growth because the
shock is multiplied by its productivity level zj;t.
In order to derive the property that the rm size distribution is a Pareto
distribution, we impose the following assumptions on the minimum level of rm
size. We assume that there is a minimum level of employment `min, i.e.,
`j;t  `min: (7)
A rm whose optimal employment size is less than `min is restructured. More
precisely, we dene the productivity level zmin as the one at which, when the
rm optimally chooses labor (following (8) below), `j;t = `min. We assume that
the rm whose productivity zj;t is less than zmin has to be restructured in the
way that the rm buys productivities and accompanying capitals from other
rms at the market price to increase the rm size. Correspondingly, we assume
that each rm sells a constant fraction of the rm to the restructuring rms (we
will discuss how the deals are conducted in the next section).
A rm chooses the investment level dkj;t and employment `j;t to maximize
the prot:
rft q(kj;t; zj;t;St; t)dt =Et

max
dkj;t;`j;t
(1  f   )dj;tdt+ dq(kj;t; zj;t;St; t)

; (8)
The dividend dj;t consists of
dj;tdt = (pj;tyj;t   wt`j;t   kj;t) dt  dkj;t;
where pj;t and yj;t are the price and quantity of the good produced by the rm,
kj;t is the capital, wt is the wage rate, and  is the depreciation rate.
By solving the rm's problem, we obtain the conditions (see Appendix B for
details):
MPKt  rft +  =
@pj;tyj;t
@kj;t
; (9)
wt =
@pj;tyj;t
@`j;t
: (10)
There are two remarks about the rm's problem. First, in the model, the MPK
becomes the same among rms because the stochastic discount factor of those
who own diversied bonds is not correlated with the shock of rm j. Second,
because the taxes in the model are imposed on dividends as in the \new view"
literature of dividend taxation (Sinn, 1991 and McGrattan and Prescott, 2005),
they do not aect the marginal product of capital (MPK).
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2.3 Aggregation and market conditions
We consider the market conditions for the aggregate economy. (Throughout the
paper, we denote the aggregate variables by upper case letters.) Goods that a
mass N of rms produces are aggregated according to
Yt =
 Z N
0

1
N
1 
yj;tdj
! 1

: (11)
We assume that the aggregate good Y is produced competitively.
The market clearing condition for nal goods is
Ct +
dKt
dt
  Kt + 

1  Ae;txe;t
Qt

Dt =Yt; (12)
where Ae;t is the total assets of entrepreneurs and Qt is aggregate nancial
asset. The last term in the left hand side of the equation indicates that a part
of the nal goods is consumed as transaction costs. The labor market clearing
condition is Z N
0
`jdj = L: (13)
The market clearing condition for the shares of rms is
sj + s
f
j =1; (14)
where sj is the shares owned by the entrepreneur according to (4) and s
f
j is the
shares owned by nancial intermediaries. We assume that government transfers
are adjusted so that tax revenues equal government transfers period by period.
3 Firm side Properties
Before dening and solving the model, we review the following rm side prop-
erties of the model. First, in this model, given rft , the rm side variables such
as `j;t, kj;t, and dj;t can be obtained as the closed-form expressions. These
variables can be written as a product of the components common across rms
and the heterogeneous component. Second, the distribution of rm's produc-
tivity is obtained independently of other variables and is a Pareto distribution
that establishes Zipf's law of rms when the minimum employment level `min is
suciently small.
3.1 Firm side variables
Employing rm's FOCs (9) and (10) together with the aggregate condition (11)
and the labor market condition (13), the rm's variables can be written as
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follows (for the derivations, see Appendices B.2 and B.3):
`j;t = `t z

1 
j;t ; where `t 
0B@ L=N
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o
1CA ; (15)
pj;tyj;t = pyt`t z

1 
j;t ; where pyt 


MPKt
 
1 
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o 1 

1
1 
; (16)
kj;t = kt`tz

1 
j;t ; where kt 


MPKt
 1
1 
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o 1 

1
1 
; (17)
dj;tdt = dt`tz

1 
j;t dt 


1  

zkt`tz

1 
j;t dBj;t; (18)
where dt  (1  (1  ))pyt   ( + k;t) kt;
qj;t = qt`tz

1 
j;t ; where qt  (1  f   )dt
Z 1
t
exp

 
Z u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds

du:
(19)
Note that E
n
z

1 
j;t
o
is the average of z

1 
j;t over the rm size distribution (we will
show later that the average exists), and k;t and d;t are the expected growth
rate of kj;t and dj;t.
In the above equations, each variables have the common components such as
`t and pyt and the heterogeneous component, z

1 
j;t . Thus, the size distributions
of the rm side variables depend only on the heterogeneous component.
3.2 Restructuring
Before deriving the rm size distribution, we analyze how restructuring rms
buy the assets of other rms. In each small time interval some rms decrease
their productivities from t and t+ dt to zj;t+dt < zmin. Then, these rms have
to buy qt+dt`t+dt

z

1 
min   z

1 
j;t+dt

from other rms to increase the rm size. We
denote the total of these payments in the restructured rms as Qrestructuring;t+dt.
At each instant, each rm sells a constant fraction m


1 

dt of the rm's
value to these restructuring rms at the market price m


1 

qj;tdt. (The
adjustment term


1 

enters because rm side variables are proportional to
z

1 
j;t .) The total value of the sellouts is
m


1  

dt
Z N
0
qj;tdj = Nqt+dt`t+dtE
n
z

1 
j;t
o
m


1  

dt:
Since the demand of restructuring rms equates the supply:
Qrestructuring;t+dt =Nqt+dt`t+dtE
n
z

1 
j;t
o
m


1  

dt: (20)
Rearranging this equation and taking the limit as dt approaches zero from above,
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we obtain (see Appendix B.4 for details)
m =

  
1  

2z
4
; (21)
where  is the Pareto exponent of the rm size distribution pinned down in the
next section.
3.3 Firm size distribution
We detrend the rm's productivity to derive the invariant productivity distri-
bution. Let ~zj;t be the rm's productivity level after selling a part of the rm's
assets to restructuring rms, detrended by egzt (gz is a constant whose value is
determined below). The rm's detrended productivity growth after sellout is
d~zj;t = (z   gz  m) ~zj;tdt+ z~zj;tdBj;t;
or, d ln ~zj;t =

z   gz   
2
z
2
 m

dt+ zdBj;t: (22)
The Fokker-Planck equation for the probability density fz(ln ~zj;t; t) for rm's
productivity is
@fz(ln ~zj;t; t)
@t
=  

z   gz   
2
z
2
 m

@fz(ln ~zj;t; t)
@ ln ~zj;t
+
2z
2
@2fz(ln ~zj;t; t)
@(ln ~zj;t)2
:
In this paper, we assume the invariant distribution for rms, i.e., @fz(ln ~zj;t; t)=@t =
0. When the invariant distribution exists, the Fokker-Planck equation has a so-
lution in exponential form,
fz(ln ~zj;t) = C0 exp(  ln ~zj;t); (23)
where the coecients satisfy:
C0 = ~z

min;  =  2

z   gz   
2
z
2
 m

=2z : (24)
(23) shows that the distribution of ln ~zj;t follows an exponential distribution.
By change of variables, it can also be shown that the distribution of ~zj;t follows
a Pareto distribution whose Pareto exponent is .
In this model, the exogenous parameter `min pins down  and gz. From the
restriction on `min and (15), we obtain the Pareto exponent for ~zj;t as,
 =
1
1  `minL=N


1  

: (25)
With this , we obtain the rescaling parameter gz that assures the existence of
the invariant distribution of ~zj;t.
There are four remarks on the rm size distribution. First, we obtain a
constant rescaled mean E
n
~z

1 
j;t
o
for a constant ~zmin as follows:
E
n
~z

1 
j;t
o
=
Z 1
~zmin
~z

1  fz(ln ~z)
@ ln ~z
@~z
d~z =
C0~z
 (  1  )
min
  1 
:
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it is shown that when ~zmin is a constant E
n
~z

1 
j;t
o
is also a constant.
Second, the growth rate of the aggregate output is g  gz=(1  ). We can
conrm this property by detrending and aggregating (16).
Third, the expected growth rate of ~z

1 
j;t is negative. It means that the
expected growth rate of the detrended rm side variables is negative, while the
mean of the detrended rm size distribution, which is proportional to E
n
~z

1 
j;t
o
,
is constant. This is a key property that generates a Pareto distribution with a
nite distributional mean.
Fourth, Zipf's law approximately holds for the rm size distribution, e.g.,
the distribution of `j;t. This is because the rm size distribution cross-sectionally
obeys to ~z

1 
j;t , whose Pareto exponent is 


1 

. (25) shows that = (=(1  )) >
1 and that if `min is suciently small compared with the average employment
level L=N , = (=(1  )) becomes close to 1.
4 Equilibrium and Solution of the Model
In this model, because the household policy functions are independent of the
household's wealth level, the dynamics of aggregate variables are obtained in-
dependent of the heterogeneity within entrepreneurs and workers.
4.1 Denition of a competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium of the model given initial aggregate capital K0, ini-
tial asset shares of entrepreneurs, innate workers, and former entrepreneurs,
Ae;0=A0, Aw;0=A0, Af;0=A0, and the stationary detrended rm size distribu-
tion, is a set of variables,
n
Ae;t; Aw;t; Af;t;Ht;Kt; Yt; Ct; dj;t; r
f
t ; wt; tr t; vt; xt
o
,
that satises the following conditions:
 household's decisions on the portfolio choice (4) and (5) and the law of
motion for human and total assets (1) and (2),
 rm's decisions (15){(19),
 and the market clearing conditions (12) and (14).
4.2 Solution of the model
Let variables with tilde such as ~Kt be the variables detrended by e
gt. The
aggregate dynamics of the detrended variables can be reduced to the dierential
equations of St =
n
~Ae;t; ~Aw;t; ~Af;t; ~Ht; ~Kt
o
. The evolution of these variables is
computed at each t as follows:
1. Given ~Kt,
MPKt =E
n
z

1 
j;t
o 1 
  ~Kt
L
!1 
:
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2. ~Ct = v ~At and ~Qt = ~At   ~Ht. Given MPKt, ~Yt = pyt=egt is pinned down.
Then,
d ~Kt
dt
=~Yt    ~Kt   ~Ct   
 
1 
~Ae;txt
~Qt
!
~Dt   g ~Kt;
~Dt =(1  (1  )) ~Yt   ( + g + E) ~Kt  
d ~Kt
dt
;
and xe;t are jointly determined.
Note that, here, the expected return and volatility of a risky asset are
jointly determined as follows (see Appendix B.3 for details of the deriva-
tions):
q;t =
8<:

1  e
(1  f   )   1

1R1
t
exp
n
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
o
du
+ rft
9=; ;
q;t =


1  

z

8<:1 

1  e
(1  f   )
 ~Kt
~Dt
1R1
t
exp
n
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
o
du
9=; ;
where
R1
t
exp
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
	
du is computed by the following equa-
tion: Z 1
t
exp

 
Z u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds

du =
~Qt
(1  f   ) ~Dt
:
3. The assets for the three types of households evolve as:
d ~Ae;t
dt
=(ae;t   g) ~Ae;t + ( + pf )N ~Ht=L  ( + pf ) ~Ae;t;
d ~Aw;t
dt
=(aw;t   g) ~Aw;t + (L  ( + pf )N) ~Ht=L   ~Aw;t;
d ~Af;t
dt
=(aw;t   g) ~Af;t + pf ~Ae;t    ~Af;t;
where ae;t and aw;t are calculated according to (4) and (5). The human
asset evolves as
d ~Ht
dt
=  ( ~wt + ~tr t)L+ ( + rft   g) ~Ht; (26)
where
~wt =(1  ) ~Yt=L;
~tr t =
(
~Ae;txe;t
~Qt
 e +
 
1 
~Ae;txe;t
~Qt
!
f
)
~Dt=L:
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5 Household's Asset Distributions in the Steady
State
In this model, the steady state household asset distribution can be derived
analytically. We show below that the distributions of entrepreneurs, innate
workers, and former entrepreneurs are all Pareto distributions. We also discuss
that the asset, income, and consumption distributions of the total households
follow a Pareto distribution at the upper-tail whose Pareto exponent coincides
with that of the asset distribution of entrepreneurs.
5.1 Asset distribution of entrepreneurs
Individual entrepreneur's asset, ~ae;t, if he does not die, evolves as
d ln ~ae;t =

ae   g   
2
ae
2

dt+ aedBi;t;
where ae and ae are the drift and diusion parts of the entrepreneur's asset
process. Since they are constants in the steady state, we omit time subscript.
The initial asset of entrepreneurs with age t0 at period t is ht t0 . The relative
asset of the entrepreneurs who are alive at t, relative to their initial asset is in
a logarithmic expression, ln(ae;t=ht t0) = ln ~ae;t   (ln ~ht t0   gt0), which follows
a normal distribution with mean (ae   2ae=2)t0 and variance 2aet0.
By combining the above property with the constant probability of death
assumption, the asset distribution of entrepreneurs is obtained. The probability
density function of log assets becomes a double-exponential distribution (see
Appendix C for the derivations in this section)3
fe(ln ~ai) =
8>>>><>>>>:
fe1(ln ~ai)  (+pf )NL 1 exp
h
  1(ln ~ai   ln ~h)
i
if ~ai  ~h;
fe2(ln ~ai)  (+pf )NL 1 exp
h
 2(ln ~ai   ln ~h)
i
otherwise,
where
 1 ae   g   
2
ae=2
2ae


ae   g   2ae=2
  1

;
 2 ae   g   
2
ae=2
2ae


ae   g   2ae=2
+ 1

;
 
q
2( + pf )2ae + (ae   g   2ae=2)2:
This result shows that the asset distribution of entrepreneurs follows a double-
Pareto distribution (Benhabib et al., 2012 and Toda, 2012), whose Pareto ex-
ponent at the upper-tail is  1.
3We normalize the probability density functions of entrepreneurs, innate workers, and
former entrepreneurs, fe(ln ~ai), fw(ln ~ai), and ff (ln ~ai) such thatZ 1
 1

fe(ln ~ai) + fw(ln ~ai) + ff (ln ~ai)
	
d(ln ~ai) = 1:
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5.2 Asset distribution of innate workers
Individual worker's asset, ~aw;t, if he does not die, evolves as
d ln ~aw;t = (aw   g) dt;
where aw is the drift part of the worker's asset process.
Under the asset process, the asset distribution of innate workers becomes
fw(ln ~ai) =
(
L (+pf )N
L
1
jaw gj exp

  aw g (ln ~ai   ln ~h)

if ln ~ai ln ~haw g  0,
0 otherwise.
The result shows that the log assets of innate workers follow an exponential
distribution and that the assets of innate workers follow a Pareto distribution.
With the parameter values in numerical analysis, the trend growth of worker's
asset is close to the trend growth of the economy, i.e., aw  g. Then, the
detrended assets of the innate workers are concentrated on the level around ~h.
5.3 Asset distribution of former entrepreneurs
The asset distribution of former entrepreneurs depends on the asset distribution
of entrepreneurs, the Poisson rate pf with which each entrepreneur leaves the
rm, and the asset process after he becomes a worker.
The steady state asset distribution of the former entrepreneurs under the
settings can be analytically derived. Here, for brevity, we only report the case
where aw  g (for the aw < g case, see Appendix C):
ff (ln ~ai) =
8>><>>:
pf
  1(aw g)fe1(ln ~ai) 

1
  1(aw g)   1+ 2(aw g)

pffe1(ln ~h)
 exp

  aw g (ln ~ai   ln ~h)

if ln ~ai  ln ~h,
pf
+ 2(aw g)fe2(ln ~ai) otherwise.
The probability density function for ~ai  ~h consists of two exponential terms.
The second term, representing the distribution of innate workers’distribution,
declines faster as an asset level increases than the rst term, the distribution
of entrepreneurs. Therefore, the Pareto exponent of the former entrepreneur's
asset distribution becomes the same as that for entrepreneurs in the tail (the
same result applies to the case where aw < g).
5.4 Pareto exponents of asset and income distributions for
all of the households
We make two remarks on the household asset and income distributions. First,
the Pareto exponent at the upper-tail for all of the households is that of en-
trepreneurs,  1. This is because, as noted above, the distribution of the smallest
Pareto exponent dominates at the upper-tail.
Second, in this model, the consumption and income distributions at the
upper-tail are also Pareto distributions with the same Pareto exponent as that
of assets,  1. This is because the consumption and income of a household are
proportional to the household's asset level.
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6 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we numerically analyze how the cut in top marginal tax rate
accounts for the evolution of top incomes in recent decades, by assuming that
at 1975 the tax cut occurs in an unexpected and permanent way.
There are three reasons to choose 1975 as the year of the structural change.
First, several empirical studies suggest inequality has begun to grow since the
1970s (see e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992 and Piketty and Saez, 2003). Second,
political scientists such as Hacker and Pierson (2010) argue that the U.S. politics
transformed during the 1970s in favor of industries, which might have aected
entrepreneurs’future expectations on tax rates. Third, the top marginal earned
income tax declined from 77% to 50% during the 1970s alone (see Figure 1),
which was followed by subsequent cuts in other taxes in the 1980s. These
evidences suggest that a structural change occurred during the 1970s (we choose
1975 as the median).
In our model, a tax cut aects top incomes by changing entrepreneur's in-
centive to invest in the risky assets. In the tax parameters calibrated below,
after 1975, the tax rate on risky asset e becomes relatively lower than the tax
rate on risk-free asset f , which induces entrepreneurs to increase the share of
risky assets in their asset portfolios. This is why the Pareto exponent declines
and the top income share increases in our model.
6.1 Tax rates
We assume that the tax on risky assets e is equal to the ordinary income
tax that is imposed on the CEO pay. We assume that the tax on risk-free
assets f is the sum of taxes that are imposed on dividends when investors
buy the equities of rms. We calculate the tax rate of risk-free assets, f by
1   (1    cap)(1    corp), where  cap and  corp are the marginal tax rates for
capital gains and corporate income. These tax rates are calibrated using top
statutory marginal federal tax rates reported in Saez et al. (2012) (see Figure 1
and Table 1).
Insert Figure 1 here.
Insert Table 1 here.
6.2 Calibration
The parameters are chosen to roughly match the annual data. The rst ve
parameters at Table 2 are standard values. For example, we assume for  that
the average length of life after a household begins to work is 50 years.
 is set to 0.7, which implies that 30% of rm's sales is rent. The value of 
is lower than the standard one. There are two reasons for this. First, model's
treatment of entrepreneur's income is dierent from the data: in our model,
entrepreneur's income mostly comes from rm's dividend, while in the data,
the CEO pay is in most situations categorized in the labor income. A lower 
is chosen to take it into account. Second, if  is high, under the situation that
entrepreneurs choose si;t according to (4), the total value of entrepreneur's risky
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assets exceeds the total value of nancial assets in the economy. To avoid this,
a low  should be chosen.
For pf , we assume that the CEO's average term of oce is 20 years. `min
is set to unity, which implies that the minimum employment level is one per-
son. We assume that L = 1:0 and N = 0:05, which implies that the average
employment per a rm is 20 persons, which is consistent with the data reported
in Davis et al. (2007). Under the settings, the Pareto exponent of the rm size
distribution in the model is 1=(1   0:05)  1:0526, which is roughly consistent
with Zipf's law. Note that under these parameters, for small-sized rms, the
value of an entrepreneur's risky asset calculated by (4) exceeds the value of his
rm. To resolve this problem, we assume that such an entrepreneur jointly runs
business with other entrepreneurs so that the asset value of the entrepreneurs'
risky assets does not exceeds the value of the joint rms. We assume that the
productivity shocks of the joint rms move in the same direction. A possible
story behind the assumption is that these productivity shocks are caused by
managerial decisions.
For the calibration of the rm-level volatility, we consider two cases. In Case
A, we use the average rm-level volatility of publicly traded rms. In Case B,
we use the average rm-level volatility of both publicly traded and privately
held rms. These values are taken from Davis et al. (2007). In each case, the
transaction costs of nancial intermediaries, , is calibrated to match the Pareto
exponent in the pre-1975 steady state with 2.4. that is close to the data around
1975.
Insert Table 2 here.
6.3 Computation of the transition dynamics
We compute the Pareto exponent of household's income (or asset) distribution
and the top 1% income share before and after 1975. We assume that before
1975 the economy is in the pre-1975 steady state. In our experiment, taxes
change unexpectedly and permanently at 1975, and the economy moves toward
the post-1975 steady state.
We model the transition dynamics after 1975 in the following way. First,
the dynamics of aggregate variables are computed separately. To compute the
dynamics of a set of the aggregate variables St =
n
~Ae;t; ~Aw;t; ~Af;t; ~Ht; ~Kt
o
ex-
plained in Section 4.2, we need to pin down their initial values. We suppose
that at 1975 when the tax change occurs, the aggregate capital stock is the same
as that in the pre-1975 steady state. We also suppose that asset shares of en-
trepreneurs, innate workers, and former entrepreneurs, Ae;1975=A1975, Aw;1975=A1975,
Af;1975=A1975, are the same as those in the pre-1975 steady state. The remain-
ing initial variables, ~A1975 and ~H1975 are determined by the shooting algorithm
by the following steps:
1. Set ~A1975. Set also the upper and lower bound of ~At, ~AH and ~AL.
(a) Set ~H1975 and compute the dynamics of aggregate variables as ex-
plained in Section 4.2. Stop the computation if ~At hits the upper or
lower bound, ~AH or ~AL.
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(b) Update ~H1975 by backwardly solving (26) with the terminal condition
~HT =
(1  ) ~py + ~tr
 + rf   g ;
where the variables with asterisks are those in the post-1975 steady
state and T = argminT
p
(KT  K)2 + (CT   C)2.
(c) Repeat (a) and (b) until j ~Hnew1975   ~Hold1975j < ".
2. Repeat the procedure and nd the initial value ~A1975 whose sequence ofn
~Kt; ~Ct
o
comes the closest to those at the post-1975 steady state, i.e.,
whose minT
p
(KT  K)2 + (CT   C)2 is the smallest.
Note that since ~Ct = v ~At, the above procedure is similar to the standard shoot-
ing algorithm used in standard growth models. In computation of the variables
used below, we assume that after time T  when the dynamics of Kt and Ct are
in the closest distance to the post-1975 steady state, the economy switches to
the post-1975 steady state.
Next, from the aggregate variables calculated above, we compute the vari-
ables related to entrepreneur's and worker's asset processes, ae;t, ae;t, and
aw;t. Using these variables we compute the asset (and thus income) dis-
tribution at the upper-tail. The transition dynamics of the distribution can
be computed by numerically solving the Fokker-Planck equations for the as-
set distributions of entrepreneurs and workers, fe(ln ~ai;t; t) and fl(ln ~ai;t; t) 
fw(ln ~ai;t; t) + ff (ln ~ai;t; t):
4
@fe(ln ~ai;t; t)
@t
= 
 
ae;t  
2ae;t
2
  g
!
@fe(ln ~ai;t; t)
@ ln ~ai;t
+
2ae;t
2
@2fe(ln ~ai;t; t)
@(ln ~ai;t)2
  ( + pf )fe(ln ~a; t);
@fl(ln ~ai;t; t)
@t
=  (aw;t   g) @fl(ln ~ai;t; t)
@ ln ~ai;t
  (   pf )fe(ln ~a; t):
We impose boundary conditions that lim~ai;t!1 fi(ln ~ai;t; t) = 0 and that at the
lower bound of ~ai;t, ~aLB, fi(ln ~aLB; t) moves linearly during the 50 years from
that of the pre-1975 steady state to that of the post-1975 steady state.5
6.4 Pareto exponent and the top 1% income share
Figures 2 and 3 plot the model predictions of the Pareto exponent and the top
1% share of the income distribution for Case A together with data. Data are
taken from Alvaredo et al. (2013). For the model prediction, we plot the two
steady states for the pre-1975 and post-1975 periods, and the transition path
between them.
We nd that the model traces data for the Pareto exponent well. The model
also captures the trend in the top 1% share after 1975, although the model's
4We use the partial dierential equations solver in Matlab. We set the 2000 mesh points
to ln ~ai;t between ln ~aLB to 100 and 500 mesh points to time t between 1975 to 2030.
5~aLB is set to be higher than ~h at the pre- and post-1975 steady state.
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prediction is somewhat lower in the level than data. Perhaps, other factors such
as the dierences in talents account for the gap between them.
The corresponding results for Case B are graphed in Figures 4 and 5. The
model's transitions of the Pareto exponent and the top 1% share become slower
than those in Case A. The reason is that in Case B, rm's volatility becomes
higher. This makes xe;t lower by (4), which results in lower volatility of en-
trepreneur's asset. This perhaps implies that the lower rm-level volatility at
the top rms where the richest CEOs are employed is an important factor to
understand the evolution of top incomes.
Insert Figure 2 here.
Insert Figure 3 here.
Insert Figure 4 here.
Insert Figure 5 here.
6.5 Incentive pay for CEOs
The reason for the evolution of top incomes after the tax change in the model
is that it becomes more protable for CEOs to hold risky assets. It means that
entrepreneur's portfolio share of risky assets, xe;t, increases in the post-1975
periods, possibly through utilizing employee stock options. Here, we compare
xe;t in the model with the empirical counterpart of xe;t.
An empirical counterpart of xe;t for corporate CEOs is called as \percent-
percent" incentives, which is dened by
x% increase in pay
1% increase in rm rate of return
:
The concept of \percent-percent" measure is used by Murphy (1985), Gibbons
and Murphy (1992), Rosen (1992), and Edmans et al. (2009).6
We plot the \percent-percent" incentives constructed from Frydman and
Saks (2010) and xe;t in the model in Figure 6.
7 We conrm that the data and
model are in the same order. Of course, our model is not intended to explain
the uctuations in the \percent-percent" incentive itself, and the model cannot
explain why the \percent-percent" incentives increase around the late 1950s.
Further research is needed to understand the empirical facts.
Insert Figure 6 here.
6Edmans et al. (2009) also argue that the \percent-percent" incentives are cross-sectionally
independent of the rm size. This property is satised in our model.
7The \percent-percent" data are calculated by dividing \dollar change in wealth for a 1%
increase in rm rate of return" by \total compensation," both of which are taken from Figures
5 and 6 of Frydman and Saks (2010).
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7 Conclusion
We have proposed a model of asset and income inequalities that explains Zipf's
law of rms and Pareto's law of incomes both from the same productivity shocks
of rms. Empirical studies show that the Pareto exponent of income varies over
time while the Zipf's law of rm size is quite stable. This paper consistently
explains these distributions with an analytically tractable model. We derive
closed-form expressions for the stationary distributions of rm size and individ-
ual income. The transition dynamics of those distributions are also explicitly
derived, which is then used for numerical analysis.
Our model features an entrepreneur who can invest in their own rms as
well as risk-free assets. The entrepreneur incurs a substantial transaction cost
if he diversies the risk of his portfolio returns. When a tax on risky returns
is reduced, the entrepreneur increases the share of his own rms. This in turn
increases the variance of his portfolio returns, which results in a wider dispersion
of wealth among entrepreneurs.
By calibrating the model, we have analyzed to what extent the changes in
tax rates account for the recent evolution of top incomes in the U.S. We nd
that the model matches with the decline in the Pareto exponent of income
distribution and the trend in top 1% share. There remain some discrepancies
between the model and data. For example, model's prediction of top 1% share
is somewhat lower than the data. Further research is needed for understanding
the causes of discrepancies.
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A Derivations for the household's problem
This appendix shows the derivations of the household problem in Section 2.1.
As shown in Section 4.2, the aggregate dynamics of the model is described by
St, whose evolution can be written as
dSt =S(St)dt:
By Ito's formula, V i(ai;t;St; t) is rewritten as follows:
dV i(ai;t;St; t) =
@V it
@t
dt+
@V it
@ai;t
dai;t +
1
2
@2V it
@a2i;t
(dai;t)
2 +
@V it
@St
 dSt
+

V i
0
(ai;t;St; t)  V i(ai;t;St; t)

dJi;t;
where Ji;t is the Poisson jump process describing the probability of leaving his
rm:
dJi;t =
(
0 with probability 1  pfdt
1 with probability pfdt.
Thus,
Et[dV
i
t ]
dt
=
@V it
@t
+ a;tai;t
@V it
@ai;t
+
(a;tai;t)
2
2
@2V it
@a2i;t
+ 0S(St) 
@V it
@St
+ pf

V i
0
t   V it

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Substituting in (3), we obtain a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
0 = max
ci;t;xi;t
ln ci;t   ( + )V it +
@V it
@t
+ a;tai;t
@V it
@ai;t
+
(a;tai;t)
2
2
@2V it
@a2i;t
+ 0S(St) 
@V it
@St
+ pf

V i
0
t   V it

= max
ci;t;xi;t
ln ci;t   ( + )V it +
@V it
@t
+
2q;t
2
x2i;ta
2
i;t
@2V it
@a2i;t
+ (( + q;t)xi;tai;t + ( + r
f
t )(1  xi;t)ai;t   ci;t)
@V it
@ai;t
;
+ 0S(St) 
@V it
@St
+ pf
n
V i
0
t   V it
o
: (27)
First-order conditions with respect to ci;t and xi;t are summarized by:
c 1i;t =
@V it
@ai;t
; (28)
xi;t =   @V
i
t =@ai;t 
@2V it =@a
2
i;t

ai;t
q;t   rft
2q;t
: (29)
Following Merton (1969) and Merton (1971), this problem is solved by the
following value function and linear policy functions:
V it = B
i
t ln ai;t +H(St; t);
ci;t = vi;tai;t;
qi;tsi;t = xi;tai;t;
bi;t = (1  xi;t)ai;t   ht:
We obtain this solution by guess-and-verify. The rst-order condition (28) be-
comes:
(vi;t)
 1 = Bit: (30)
Condition (29) is rewritten as:
xi;t =
q;t   rft
2q;t
: (31)
Substituting these results into (27), we nd that
vi;t = + : (32)
B Derivations for the rm's problem
B.1 Derivations of the FOCs of rm's problem
This appendix shows the derivations of rm's problem at Section 2.2.2. qj;t is
a function of kj;t, zj;t, and the aggregate dynamics St (see Appendix A). By
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applying Ito's formula to qj;t, we obtain
dq(kj;t; zj;t;St; t) =

@qj;t
@t
dt+
@qj;t
@zj;t
dzj;t +
@qj;t
@kj;t
dkj;t +
@qj;t
@St
 dSt

+
1
2
@2qj;t
@z2j;t
(dzj;t)
2
=
 
@qj;t
@t
+ z
@qj;t
@zj;t
+
1
2
2z
@2qj;t
@z2j;t
!
dt+
@qj;t
@kj;t
dkj;t + 
0
S(St) 
@qj;t
@St
+ z
@qj;t
@zj;t
dBj;t:
The FOCs for `j;t and dkj;t are
(1  f   ) = @qj;t
@kj;t
;
wt =
@pj;tyj;t
@`j;t
:
By the envelope theorem,
rft
@qj;t
@kj;t
dt =(1  f   )

@pj;tyj;t
@kj;t
dt  dt

:
By rearranging the equation, we obtain
rft =
@pj;tyj;t
@kj;t
  :
B.2 Derivations on the rm side variables
This appendix shows the derivations of the rm side variables at Section 3.1.
From (10)
wt = (1  )

Yt
N
1 
zj;tk

j;t `
(1 ) 1
j;t :
Rewriting this,
`j;t =
 
(1  )
wt

Yt
N
1 
zj;tk

j;t
! 1
1 (1 )
: (33)
On the other hand, from (9),
MPKt = 

Yt
N
1 
zj;tk
 1
j;t `
(1 )
j;t : (34)
By substituting (33) into (34) and rearranging,
k

1 (1 )
j;t =
 

MPKt

Yt
N
1 ! 1   
(1  )
wt

Yt
N
1 ! (1 )(1 )(1 (1 ))
z
 1 
j;t ;
(35)
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where   1 (1 ) . Substituting (35) into (33),
`j;t =
 

MPKt

Yt
N
1 ! 1   
(1  )
wt

Yt
N
1 ! 1 1 
z

1 
j;t (36)
By substituting this equation into the labor market condition (13) and rear-
ranging, 

MPKt

Yt
N
1 ! 1   
(1  )
wt

Yt
N
1 ! 1 1 
=
L
N
1
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o ;
(37)
or,
 
(1  )
wt

Yt
N
1 ! (1 )1 
=
8><>:
 

MPKt

Yt
N
1 ! 1 
L
N
1
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o
9>=>;
(1 )
1 
:
(38)
where E is the operator of the cross-sectional average of all rms. Then, substi-
tuting (37) into (36),
`j;t =
L
N
0B@ z

1 
j;t
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o
1CA : (39)
Rewriting (35),
kj;t =
 

MPKt

Yt
N
1 ! 1 (1 )1   
(1  )
wt

Yt
N
1 ! (1 )1 
z

1 
j;t : (40)
Substituting (38) into (40),
kj;t =
 

MPKt

Yt
N
1 ! 11  
L
N
 (1 )
1 
0BB@ z

1 
j;t
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o (1 )
1 
1CCA : (41)
Next, we derive Y . Substituting (39) and (41) into yj;t = zj;tk

j;t`
1 
j;t , and
rearranging,
yj;t =
 

MPKt

Yt
N
1 ! 1  
L
N
 1 
1 
0BB@ z
1
1 
j;t
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o (1 )
1 
1CCA :
Substituting this equation into Y =
R N
0
 
1
N
1 
yj;tdj
 1

,

Yt
N
1 
=


MPKt
(1 )
1 

L
N
1 
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o(1 )[ 1 (1 ) 1]
: (42)
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Substituting (42) into (41),
kj;t =


MPKt
 1
1 
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o 1 

1
1 

L
N
0B@ z

1 
j;t
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o
1CA
=


MPKt
 1
1 
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o 1 

1
1 
`j;t: (43)
Substituting (39) and (43) into (42)
pj;tyj;t = Y
1 
t y

j;t (44)
=


MPKt
 
1 
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o 1 

1
1 

L
N
0B@ z

1 
j;t
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o
1CA
=


MPKt
 
1 
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o 1 

1
1 
`j;t: (45)
Rewriting (39),
`j;t = `t z

1 
j;t ; where `t 
0B@ L=N
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o
1CA :
Rewriting (45),
pj;tyj;t = pyt`t z

1 
j;t ; where pyt 


MPKt
 
1 
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o 1 

1
1 
:
Rewriting (43),
kj;t = kt`tz

1 
j;t ; where kt 
 

MPKt
E
n
z

1 
j;t
o 1 

! 1
1 
: (46)
From (46),
dkj;t = d(kt`tz

1 
j;t )
=
dkt`t
dt
z

1 
j;t dt+ kt`td

z

1 
j;t

:
Note that
d

z

1 
j;t

=


1  

z +


1  


1     1

2z
2

z

1 
j;t dt+


1  

zz

1 
j;t dBj;t:
Then,
dkj;t = d(kt`tz

1 
j;t )
=
dkt`t
dt
z

1 
j;t dt+ kt`td

z

1 
j;t

= kj;t

k;tdt+


1  

zdBj;t

:
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where
k;t g   1
1  
drft =dt
MPKt
+


1  

(z   gz) +


1     1

2z
2

:
gz is the growth rate of E
n
z

1 
j;t
o
and g = gz=(1  ).
dj;tdt is computed by substituting these results into the following relation-
ship:
dj;tdt =(pj;tyj;t   wt`j;t   kj;t)dt  dkj;t
=(1  (1  ))pj;tyj;tdt  kj;tdt  dkj;t:
Then, dj;tdt is rewritten as follows:
dj;tdt = dt`tz

1 
j;t dt 


1  

zdBj;t

kt`tz

1 
j;t ;
where dt  (1  (1  ))pyt   ( + k;t) kt:
B.3 Returns on risky assets
This appendix explains the derivation of the returns on risky assets at Sections
3.1 and 4.2. Multiplying (6) by e 
R u
t
rfs ds and integrating8, we obtain
qj;t =Et
Z 1
t
(1  f   )dj;ue 
R u
t
rfs dsdu

:
By further rearranging the above equation,
qj;t =
Z 1
t
(1  f   )e 
R u
t
rfs ds Et [dj;u] du:
Because
Et[dj;u] =du`u Et[z

1 
j;u ]
=dt`t
du`u
dt`t
 exp
Z u
t


1  

z +


1  


1     1

2z
2

ds

 z

1 
j;t
=dt`tz

1 
j;t exp
Z u
t

d ln(ds`s)
ds
+


1  

z +


1  


1     1

2z
2

ds

dt`tz

1 
j;t exp
Z u
t
d;sds

:
8The Ito process version of integration by partsZ T
t
Xj;sdYj;s = Xj;TYj;T  Xj;tYj;t  
Z T
t
Yj;sdXj;s  
Z T
t
dXj;sdYj;s:
is used here. Dene t;u  e 
R u
t r
f
s ds. Then,Z 1
t
t;udqj;u = qj;ut;u j1t  
Z 1
t
qj;u( rfu)t;udu
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Therefore,
qj;t =qt`tz

1 
j;t ; where qt  (1  f   )dt
Z 1
t
exp

 
Z u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds

du:
Then,
dqj;t =qj;t
d ln(dt`t)
dt
dt+ qj;t
d(z

1 
j;t )
z

1 
j;t
+ qj;t
 1 + (rft   d;t)
R1
t
exp
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
	
duR1
t
exp
n
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
o
du
dt
=
n
 (1  f   )dt`tz

1 
j;t + r
f
t qj;t
o
dt+ qj;t


1  

zdBj;t:
Using dj;t = dt`tz

1 
j;t , the return of a risky asset is
(1  e)dj;t + dqj;t
qj;t
=
8<:

1   e
(1  f   )   1

1R1
t
exp
n
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
o
du
+ rft
9=; dt
+


1  

z
8<:1 

1  e
(1  f   )

kt
dt
1R1
t
exp
n
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
o
du
9=; dBj;t:
(47)
Note that if (rft  d;t) is constant as in the steady state,
R1
t
exp
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
	
du =
1=(rf   d) and
qj;t =
(1  f   )dt`tz

1 
j;t
rf   d :
We need to know the value of
R1
t
exp
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
	
du to compute
the return on risky assets. We calculated the value as follows. Integrating (19),
we obtain Z 1
t
exp

 
Z u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds

du =
Qt
(1  f   )dtL
:
If we know the value of Qt = At  Ht and (1  f   )dtL, we can calculate the
value of
R1
t
exp
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
	
du.
B.4 Derivations on the restructuring
This appendix shows the derivations of the restructuring at Section 3.2. Let
~zj;t be the rm's productivity level after selling a part of the rm's assets to
restructuring rms, detrended by egzt. Then, Qrestructuring;t+dt is written as
follows:
Qrestructuring;t+dt =Nqt+dt`t+dte
gztE
n
~z

1 
min   ~z

1 
j;t+dt
~zj;t+dt  ~zmino :
where E
n
~z

1 
min   ~z

1 
j;t+dt
~zj;t+dt  ~zmino is the expectation of ~z 1 min   ~z 1 j;t+dt con-
ditional on that ~zj;t+dt is lower than ~zmin. Since the evolution of ~zj;t follows
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(22) and the distribution follows (23),
E
n
~z

1 
min   ~z

1 
j;t+dt
~zj;t+dt  ~zmino = Z 1
ln ~zmin
d(ln ~zj;t)
Z ln ~zmin
 1
d(ln ~zj;t+dt)
~z

1 
min   ~z

1 
j;t+dt

fz(ln ~zj;t)fz(ln ~zj;t+dtj ln ~zj;t)
=
Z 1
ln ~zmin
d(ln ~zj;t)
Z ln ~zmin
 1
d(ln ~zj;t+dt)
~z

1 
min   ~z

1 
j;t+dt

C0e
  ln ~zj;t
 1p
22zdt
e
  (ln ~zj;t+dt (ln ~zj;t+~zdt))
2
22zdt ;
where ~z  z gz 2z=2 m, fz(ln ~zj;t+dtj ln ~zj;t) is the distribution of ln ~zj;t+dt
conditional on ln ~zj;t, which follows a normal distribution, and fz(ln ~zj;t) is the
steady state rm size distribution.
Under the setup, taking the limit as dt approaches zero from above, (20)
becomes
E
n
~z

1 
j;t
o
m


1  

= lim
dt!0+
E
n
~z

1 
min   ~z

1 
j;t+dt
~zj;t+dt  ~zmino
dt
= lim
t0!0+
dE
n
~z

1 
min   ~z

1 
j;t+t0
~zj;t+t0  ~zmino
dt0
: (48)
dE
n
~z

1 
min   ~z

1 
j;t+t0
~zj;t+t0  ~zmino=dt0 can be further calculated:
dE
n
~z

1 
min   ~z

1 
j;t+t0
~zj;t+t0  ~zmino
dt0
=
Z 1
ln ~zmin
d(ln ~zj;t)
Z ln ~zmin
 1
d(ln ~zj;t+t0)
d
dt0
0@~z 1 min   ~z 1 j;t+t0C0e  ln ~zj;t 1p
22zt
0 e
  (ln ~zj;t+t0 (ln ~zj;t+~zt
0))
2
22zt
0
1A
=
C0e
 ( ( 1  )) ln ~zmin


1 

4

 


1 


 
e
1
2(2~z+
2
z)t
0
(2~z + 
2
z) Erfc
"
(~z + 
2
z)
p
t0p
2z
#
 e 12 ( 1  )(2~z+( 1  )2z)t0

2~z +


1  

2z

Erfc
24

~z +


1 

2z
p
t0
p
2z
35!:
By combining these results and taking the limit, we obtain
lim
t0!0+
dE
n
~z

1 
min   ~z

1 
j;t+t0
~zj;t+t0  ~zmino
dt0
=
1
4
C0e
 ( ( 1  )) ln ~zmin


1  

2z
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Substituting this result into (48), we nally obtain
m =

  
1  

2z
4
:
C Derivations on Household's Asset Distribu-
tions in the Steady State
This appendix shows the derivations of the household asset distributions at
Section 5.
C.1 Derivations on the asset distribution of entrepreneurs
Discussion in Section 5.1 indicates that the probability density function of en-
trepreneurs at age t0 whose detrended log wealth level is ln ~ai is
fe(ln ~aijt0) = 1p
22aet
0 exp
 
  (ln ~ai   (ln
~h+ (ae   g   2ae=2)t0))2
22aet
0
!
:
The probability density of entrepreneurs whose age is t0 is
fe(t
0) =
( + pf )N
L
exp ( ( + pf )t0) :
By combining them, we can calculate the probability density function of
entrepreneur's asset distribution, fe(ln ~ai), by
fe(ln ~ai) =
Z 1
0
dt0 fe(t0)fe(ln ~aijt0);
To derive fe(ln ~ai) in Section 5.1, we apply to the above equation the following
formula:Z 1
0
exp( at  b2=t)=ptdt =
p
=a exp( 2bpa); for a > 0; b > 0.
C.2 Derivations on the asset distribution of innate work-
ers
The asset distribution of innate workers is calculated as follows:
fw(ln ~ai) =
Z 1
0
dt0 fw(t0)fw(ln ~aijt0)
=
Z 1
0
dt0
L  ( + pf )N
L
exp( t0)  1(ln ~ai = ln ~h+ (aw   g)t0)
=
Z ln ~h+(aw g)1
ln ~h
dt0
d ln ~ai
d(ln ~ai)  L  ( + pf )N
L
exp

  
aw   g (ln ~ai   ln
~h)

 1(ln ~ai = ln ~h+ (aw   g)t0)
=
(
L (+pf )N
L
1
jaw gj exp

  aw g (ln ~ai   ln ~h)

if ln ~ai ln ~haw g  0,
0 otherwise.
Note that 1(ln ~ai = ln ~h+ (aw   g)t0) is a unit function that takes 1 if ln ~ai =
ln ~h+ (aw   g)t0) and 0 otherwise.
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C.3 Derivations on the asset distribution of former en-
trepreneurs
The asset distribution of former entrepreneurs is derived as follows. Let t0m 
(ln ~ai   ln ~h)=(aw   g). First, we consider the case where aw  g. If ln ~ai 
ln ~h, then
ff (ln ~ai) =
Z t0m
0
dt0 pffe1(ln ~ai   (aw   g)t0) exp( t0)
+
Z 1
t0m
dt0 pffe2(ln ~ai   (aw   g)t0) exp( t0)
=
  pf
    1(aw   g)fe1(ln ~ai   (aw   g)t
0) exp( t0)
t0m
0
+
  pf
 +  2(aw   g)fe2(ln ~ai   (aw   g)t
0) exp( t0)
1
t0m
=
pf
    1(aw   g) f fe1(ln ~ai   (aw   g)t
0
m) exp( t0m) + fe1(ln ~ai)g
+
pf
 +  2(aw   g) f 0 + fe2(ln ~ai   (aw   g)t
0
m) exp( t0m)g :
By substituting into the above equation the following relations: ln ~ai   (aw  
g)t0m = ln ~h, fe1(ln ~h) = fe2(ln ~h), and t
0
m = (ln ~ai   ln ~h)=(aw   g), we obtain
ff (ln ~ai) =
pf
    1(aw   g)fe1(ln ~ai)
 

1
    1(aw   g)  
1
 +  2(aw   g)

pffe1(ln ~h)
 exp

  
aw   g (ln ~ai   ln
~h)

:
If ln ~ai < ln ~h,
ff (ln ~ai) =
Z 1
0
dt0pffe2(ln ~ai   (aw   g)t0) exp( t0)
=
pf
 +  2(aw   g)fe2(ln ~ai):
Next, we consider the case where aw < g. If ln ~ai  ln ~h, then
ff (ln ~ai) =
Z 1
0
dt0pffe1(ln ~ai   (aw   g)t0) exp( t0)
=
pf
    1(aw   g)fe1(ln ~ai):
30
If ln ~ai < ln ~h,
ff (ln ~ai) =
Z t0m
0
dt0pffe2(ln ~ai   (aw   g)t0) exp( t0)
+
Z 1
t0m
dtpffe1(ln ~ai   (aw   g)t0) exp( t0)
=
pf
 +  2(aw   g)fe2(ln ~ai)
 

1
 +  2(aw   g)  
1
    1(aw   g)

pffe1(ln ~h)
 exp

  
aw   g (ln ~ai   ln
~h)

:
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pre-1975 post-1975
ordinary income tax, ord 0:75 0:40
corporate income tax,  corp 0:50 0:35
capital gain tax,  cap 0:25 0:25
 e 0:75 0:40
f 0:63 0:51
Table 1: Tax rates
Notes: The gures of those in the upper half of the Table are calibrated from
the top statutory marginal federal tax rates in Figure 1, which is taken from
Saez et al. (2012). The tax rate on risky assets,  e, is set to be equal to ord.
The tax rate on risk-free assets, f , is calculated by 1  (1   cap)(1   corp),
 discount rate 0.04
 prob. of death 1=50
 capital share 1=3
 depreciation rate 0.1
g steady state growth rate 0.02
 elasticity of substitution 0.7
pf prob. of entrepreneur's quit 1=20
`min min. level of employment 1
L fraction of population 1.0
N fraction of employees 0.05
Case A Case B

1 

z rm-level vol. of employment 0:25 0:45
 transaction costs of n. intermed. 0.215 0.243
Table 2: Calibrated parameters
Notes: The gures on the rm-level volatility of employment are taken from
Figure 2.6 of Davis et al. (2007). Case A corresponds to the case where the
rm-level volatility is equal to that of publicly traded rms in the data and
Case B corresponds to the case where the rm-level volatility is equal to that
of both publicly traded and privately held rms in the data.
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Figure 1: Federal tax rates
Note: The data are taken from Table A1 of Saez et al. (2012).









	 		  	 
 
	  	  	  	 
 	

	
 	
Figure 2: Pareto exponent: Case A
Note: Data are taken from Alvaredo et al. (2013).
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Figure 3: Top 1% share: Case A
Note: Data are taken from Alvaredo et al. (2013).
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Figure 4: Pareto exponent: Case B
Note: Data are taken from Alvaredo et al. (2013).
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Figure 5: Top 1% share: Case B
Note: Data are taken from Alvaredo et al. (2013).
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Figure 6: "Percent-percent" incentives
Notes: The \percent-percent" data are calculated by dividing \dollar change in
wealth for a 1% increase in rm rate of return" by \total compensation," both
of which are estimated in Frydman and Saks (2010). These data correspond to
the median value of the fty largest rms.
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